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Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics serves as a foundational text in the study of 
jurisprudence.  Aristotle develops a comprehensive philosophy of justice based on the 
bifurcation of this virtue into general justice and particular justice. The general is 
described as a meta-excellence1. The particular involves the distribution of goods and 
the rectification of injury.   
These Aristotelian philosophies, and derivations thereof, are embedded in the 
Judeo-Christian and Western legal traditions.  Therefore, analysis of modern law in 
relation to the Aristotelian concept of justice serves multiple purposes. First, a strong 
understanding of this jurisprudential history provides perspective when considering and 
evaluating past, present, and future laws or legal trends.  Second, principles of 
Aristotle's particular justice, specifically the elements associated with rectification or 
retribution, serve as useful benchmarks and standards in evaluation of modern law.     
In this paper, the Aristotelian concept of justice is introduced and summarized.  
Justice in the general sense is detailed with analysis of related matters of disposition, 
unequal-mindedness, and law.  Particular justice is then analyzed with special attention 
to the distributive and rectificatory aspects. The relationship of particular justice to 
proportionality, reciprocity, equalization, the unjust person, and reasonableness are 
explicated.  Finally, Aristotelian rectificatory justice is contrasted with a modern 
American jurisprudence, specifically the United State Supreme Court holding allowing 
enhanced criminal sentencing in "hate crimes". 
                                            
1 Broadie, S., and Rowe, C., Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 




Justice is the sort of disposition that makes people do just things, namely act 
justly (dikaioma) and wish for what is just.2 The just person then seeks to execute the 
just act and wishes for the just. Injustice is similar in that it is a disposition that makes 
people act unjustly (adikema) and wish for what is unjust.3  This disposition is a 
character excellence with special emphasis in the Nicomachean Ethics.  
Justice, as a disposition, is differentiated from capacity (dunamis) or expertise 
(techne).  Capacity and expertise relate to both members of a pair of contraries. Justice 
is a disposition, one of a pair of contraries, and does not relate in the same way.4 Justice 
does not lead to our doing both just and unjust acts.  Justice leads to only the just act.   
A person acts justly when he acts as a just man acts. As a just act is identifiable, 
so can an unjust act be identified.  The just action serves to clarify the unjust action and 
vice-versa.  Further, as justice may be said in more than one way, so may injustice be 
said in more than one way.5 People regard as unjust both the person who breaks the law 
and the grasping, unequal-minded one.6  Conversely, the law abiding person and the 
equal-minded one are considered just.7 Just is then considered the lawful and equal, and 
the unjust unlawful and unequal.8  
                                            
2 Nicomachean Ethics V.1 (1129a8-11) 
3 NE V.1 (1129a10-11) 
4 NE V.1 (1129a13-16) 
5 NE V.1 (1129a26-27) 
6 NE V.1 (1129a32-33) 
7 NE V.1 (1129a34) 
8 NE V.1 (1129b1-2); V.2 (1130b7-10) 
The lawful is more easily determined due to legal pronouncements, decrees, and 
codes.  The equal is more difficult to establish and value. 
 
Unequal-Mindedness 
The unjust act involves grasping (pleonexia) which places this action in the 
sphere of the operation of goods, specifically those to which good and bad fortune 
relate.9 Aristotle states that human beings "pray for these, and go after them; but they 
should rather pray that what are goods generally speaking be good for them too, while 
choosing the things that are good for them."10 Seeking the greater share is not requisite 
to unjust act as the unjust person seeks less in the case of the generally bad.11 By 
seeking the lesser of the bad, the unjust person is actually grasping for more of the good 
in keeping with unequal-mindedness.12 
 
Law 
Everything in accordance with the law is in a way just.13 Legal pronouncements 
aim toward what is either "common advantage to all, or at what is of advantage to the 
best people, or of those in power, or on some other basis of this sort; so that in one way 
we call just the things that create and preserve happiness and its parts for the citizen 
community."14 The law also enjoins citizens to act in accordance with excellences, 
                                            
9 NE V.1 (1129b2-4) 
10 NE V.1 (1129b4-6) 
11 NE V.1 (1129b6-8) 
12 NE V.1 (1129b9-10) 
13 NE V.1 (1129b12-13) 
14 NE V.1 (1129b15-20) 
ordering some actions and forbidding others.15  Thus, justice is complete excellence in 
relation to another person and often considered the "mightiest of the excellences".16  
Furthermore, justice is "the activation of complete excellence" because the 
person who possesses justice "has capacity to put his excellence in use in relation to 
another person".17   The just man acts for the advantage of another which is a more 
difficult task.18 The nature of this action being for another provides a unique motivation 
and action not expressed in an area "special or exclusive" to itself.19 The virtue is more 
expansive.  Justice is excellence as a whole and injustice badness as a whole.20 
Nonetheless, justice and excellence remain distinguishable as justice in one sense 
involves the relationship of the state to another person; alternatively, justice as a 
disposition is excellence.21 
It can then be determined that the person who is just in the general sense "will be 
on who acts out of respect for all concerned and with respect for the law."22 Therefore, 
it is possible to exercise specific virtue without having general justice.  As general 
justice is directed toward another, exercising virtue purely by habit without 
consideration of the other is insufficient.  
This general justice differs from particular justice involving distribution of 
goods and retribution for injury.  
                                            
15 NE V.1 (1129b20-25) 
16 NE V.1 (1129b26-30) 
17 NE V.1 (1129b31-1130a1) 
18 NE V.1 (1130a5-9) 
19 Broadie, S., and Rowe, C., Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002) at 35 
20 NE V.1 (1130a9-13) 
21 NE V.1 (1130a11-16) 
22 Broadie, S., and Rowe, C., Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002) at 34 
Particular Justice 
 There is justice which is part of excellence just as there is injustice as part of 
badness.23 There exists a certain sort of justice as a whole, and a part of it, sharing the 
same name because its definition is the same genus.  The difference being one form of 
justice involves money, honour, security, or pleasure from profit.24  This form is the 
particular. The general form involves the things that concern the person of 
excellence.25  
 "Of the justice that is a part, and of what is just in this sense, one sort is the one 
found in distributions of honour, or money, or the other things to be divided up among 
those who are members of the political association; while another is rectificatory, 
operating in interactions between one person and another."26 The rectificatory type is 
either voluntary at the beginning or countervoluntary, meaning clandestine (i.e. theft, 
adultery) or violent (i.e. assault, murder).27 
 
Distribution of Goods 
In considering distributive justice, Aristotle identified the equal as the 
intermediate; thereby given the just is equal, it will also be an intermediate.28 So what is 
just is both intermediate and equal, and relative as it relates to certain individuals.29 As 
                                            
23 NE V.2 (1130a14-16) 
24 NE V.2 (1130a32-1130b4) 
25 NE V.2 (1130a32-1130b4) 
26 NE V.2 (1130b30-1131a2) 
27 NE V.2 (1131a2-8) 
28 NE V.3 (1131a10-15) 
29 NE V.3 (1131a15-17) 
an intermediate, justice will be between certain things.30 As it is equal, justice will 
involve two things. As it is just, it will relate to certain individuals.31 There will also be 
equality between the things and the individuals so if the individuals are equal, they will 
have equal shares. Conversely, if the individuals are not equal, then they will not have 
equal shares.32 The shares will instead have proportion. 
It is the introduction of proportionality that is both unavoidable and 
problematic.  Proportionality according to merit depends on political system and will 
differ between democracies, oligarchies, and aristocracies.33 Regardless of constitution, 
the just, then, represents a kind of geometric proportion.34 What is just is the 
proportionate and what is unjust is what contravenes the proportion.35 
 
Rectification of Injury 
The rectificatory, or retributive, form of particular justice involves voluntary and 
countervoluntary interactions between people.36 Retributive justice, unlike distributive, 
involves an arithmetic proportion.37 The law concentrates on the difference created by 
the damage done, not the relative equality or inequality of the interested individuals.38 
Interested individuals are treated equally by the law. It is the effect of the action and the 
commission which constitute unequal parts of the division.   
                                            
30 NE V.3 (1131a17-18) 
31 NE V.3 (1131a19) 
32 NE V.3 (1131a21-23) 
33 NE V.3 (1131a24-30) 
34 NE V.3 (1131a30, 1131b14) 
35 NE V.3 (1131a17-19) 
36 NE V.4 (1131b25-26) 
37 NE V.4 (1132a1-3) 
38 NE V.4 (1132a3-7) 
The imposition of loss on the agent, or doer, equalizes their gain received.  
Justice in terms of rectification will be the intermediate between the loss, incurred by 
the victim, and the gain, incurred by the doer.39 The intermediate is sought assuming the 
lawgiver, or the judge, serves as the intermediate or mediator providing equality to each 
side. The just, or dikaion, results from the matter of cutting dicha, or into two allowing 
for arithmetical proportion.40 So, the just is the intermediate between the kind of gain 
and loss that are countervoluntary; resulting in an equal amount for the victim before 
and after the action.41 
 
Reciprocity and Equalization 
In distributive and rectificatory justice, pure reciprocity (lex talionis) fails to 
substitute or satisfy proportion.42 Particularly in the commercial or city setting, 
reciprocal action governed by proportion is required.43 It is the necessity of coupling 
opposites in exchange that begs for proportional reciprocity as evidenced by the 
example of the homebuilder and the shoemaker.44 The equalization allows for 
exchange. It is the proportional equality which must first be recognized in order for 
them to exact commerce.   
Otherwise, the inherent inequality in product- a house versus a shoe- would 
disallow a transaction hindering both commerce and the city to develop.  It is from these 
                                            
39 NE V.4 (1132a18-20) 
40 NE V.4 (1132a28-30) 
41 NE V.4 (1132b18-20) 
42 NE V.4 (1132b24-25) 
43 NE V.5 (1132b34-38) 
44 NE V.5 (1133a7-9) 
needs and understanding of equalization from which currency derives.45 "Currency, 
then, acts like a measure, making things commensurate and so equalizing them; for 
there would be no association without exchange, no exchange without equality, and no 
equality without commensurability".46 
 
Unjust Person and the Unjust Act 
Just action is "an intermediate between doing what is unjust and being subjected 
to what is unjust; for the one is having too much, the other having too little".  Thereby, 
justice is an intermediate disposition, differing from other excellences, because it serves 
to achieve the intermediate or mesos.47 A just person is disposed to the just act; deciding 
to distribute with proportional equality between himself and others, or simply between 
others.48 Injustice, conversely, is the unjust act and contrary to right proportion. One 
may behave unjustly without being unjust; alternatively, one may be justly while being 
unjust49  For example, a just man may commit an unjust or criminal act, such as 
stealing, without being unjust. Also, a thief who is unjust may commit a just act.  
The distinction in this scenario rests in context- the just without qualification 
versus just within the political community.50  The "politically just" divides into the 
natural and the legal.51  The natural has the same force universally regardless of 
political form and does not involve decision. The legal has force when enacted and 
                                            
45 NE V.5 (1133a30) 
46 NE V.5 (1133b16-20) 
47 NE V.5 (1133b31-33) 
48 NE V.5 (1134a1-6) 
49 NE V.6 (1134a21-23) 
50 NE V.6 (1134a25-27) 
51 NE V.7 (1134b19) 
involves the laying down of certain laws or decrees.52  The legal are "just arrangements 
established not by nature but by human beings and are not the same everywhere" as 
political constitutions may vary.53  
An unjust act and the unjust differ; so, too, a just act and the just differ.  The 
unjust is by nature or prescription. When the unjust is committed, it is an unjust act.54  
Prior to being committed, the unjust act is simply unjust.  The unjust and just acts 
require voluntariness. If counter-voluntary, then the act is merely incidentally unjust or 
just.55  "An unjust act, or a just one, is marked off by the distinction between voluntary 
and counter-voluntary; for when something unjust is done voluntarily, it is an object of 
censure, and at the same time it is, then, an unjust act."56Aristotle defines voluntariness 
as a person acting "knowingly" and "not in ignorance of relevant factors" or "under 
force".57 
Aristotle proceeds to identify three (3) harms stemming from personal 
interactions.  The first harm is mistake which involves ignorance.58 The doer supposes 
the wrong affect, action, instrument, or person.  Or, the agent anticipates the outcome 
but the harm is inflicted without "bad intent".59 When the agent proceeds in ignorance 
because of ignorance, he warrants sympathy.60The second harm is misfortune which 
                                            
52 NE V.7 (1134b20-25) 
53 NE V.7 (1134a3-5) 
54 NE V.7 (1135a10-12) 
55 NE V.8 (1135a16-18) 
56 NE V.8 (1135a20-23) 
57 NE V.8 (1135a23-29) 
58 NE V.8 (1135b11-12) 
59 NE V.8 (1135b17-18) 
60 NE V.8 (1136a7-8) 
involves an outcome "contrary to reasonable expectation".61  The third harm is the 
unjust act which involves the agent inflicting harm "knowingly but without prior 
deliberation" such as acts done through temper or affection.62  These acts lack prior 
decision or premeditation and may provide simply the appearance of injustice. The 
unjust act does not qualify the agent as unjust or of bad character as the harm does not 
derive from badness.63 Alternatively, when the harm inflicted results from decision and 
is contrary to proportion or equality of distribution, the doer is both unjust and a bad 
character.64  In keeping, a person is just when he acts justly from decision; someone acts 
justly if he merely does the just act voluntarily.65 
In viewing the unjust act, it is not necessarily the beneficiary who is unjust.  
Instead, it is the agent who assigns the benefit that may be unjust. "[F]or it is not the 
person to whom what is unjust belongs that acts unjustly, but the person to whom it 
belongs to do what is unjust voluntarily, and this is located in the source from which the 
action has its origin, which is in the person distributing not receiving."66 The unjust act 
also requires the agent to be in a certain state and is limited to only human beings.67 
Further, for something to be just or unjust there must also be more than one person 
involved.68 It is only in limited forms of disparate relationships, such as between master 
and slave, where a person may arguably treat oneself unjustly.69 
                                            
61 NE V.8 (1135b16-18) 
62 NE V.8 (1135b20-21) 
63 NE V.8 (1135b24-25) 
64 NE V.8 (1135b25-26, 1136a1-4) 
65 NE V.8 (1136a4-5) 
66 NE V.9 (1136b26-31) 
67 NE V.9 (1137a23-24, 30-31) 
68 NE V.11 (1138a20-21) 
69 NE V.10 (1138b6-10) 
Reasonableness 
 Reasonableness, epieikeia, shares many traits of justice but relates more 
specifically to equity.  While the reasonable is just, it is not the just according to the law 
but a "rectification of the legally just".70 While law is universal there are instances 
where the application is incorrect. In case of universal pronouncement of law where the 
application is incorrect, the law chooses the reasonable while fully recognizing the 
error.71 
 Reasonableness is commonly considered or called "equity" and resides outside 
of the universal pronouncement of law. Yet, application of the reasonable, or equitable, 
is no less correct as the "error is not in the law, or in the lawgiver, but in the nature of 
the case."72 Therefore, the reasonable is just and better in specific instances.  However, 
the reasonable is never better than what is just without qualification.73 
 The reasonable person is then someone who is not rigid or a "stickler for justice 
in the bad sense"74. This person is liberal in approach, recognizing application and need 
for equity.  Reasonableness serves as a disposition to act in this manner; a kind of 




                                            
70 NE V.10 (1137b10-12) 
71 NE V.10 (1137b15-18) 
72 NE V.10 (1137b18-20) 
73 NE V.10 (1137b25-26) 
74 NE V.10 (1138a1-3) 
75 NE V.10 (1138a13-5) 
Application to Modern American Law 
 The justice theories advanced by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics serve as  
useful tools in analysis of current law.  To evidence this assertion, contemporary 
American "hate crime" law will be contrasted with Aristotelian retributive justice.  
More specifically, the United States Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 
which  allowed for enhanced criminal sentencing in "hate crimes", will be contrasted 
with Aristotelian concepts.. 
 Currently, both federal statute and United States Supreme Court precedent 
allows for increased sentencing in "hate crime".76  Hate crime occurs when a perpetrator 
targets a victim because of his or her membership in a certain social group, usually 
defined by race, religion, sexual orientation, nationality, or gender. Hate crimes are 
considered different than conventional crime based on the rationale that said crimes are 
not directed simply at an individual, but an entire group people.  Despite existing within 
the American law for nearly fourteen years, this area remains a hotly debated and 
controversial topic. 
 For the purpose of analysis, we will consider the undsiputed facts associated 
with Wisconsin vs. Mitchell. In this case, Todd Mitchell and several black males 
assaulted and battered a young white man after watching the movie Mississippi 
Burning.  Mitchell incited the violence and targeting of the young white victim based on 
race.  The attack was without provocation by the victim.  The motivation for the beating 
was later  attributed to anger generated by Mitchell and friends from a disturbing scene 
of racially motivated violence in the aforementioned movie. The Supreme Court ruled 
                                            
76 28 U.S.C. 994 (1994); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) 
that Mitchell and his fellow co-defendants may suffer enhanced, increased criminal 
sentences based on the targeting of the victim based on race. 
To analyze this case from an Aristotelian perspective is difficult but 
illuminating. This specific case relates to the partcular form of justice.  The general 
form is less relevant as the court ruling regarding punishment is essentially retributive. 
This rectificatory form of particular justice involves voluntary and countervoluntary 
interactions between people. The actions of Mitchell and his co-defendants were 
voluntary whereas the impact on the victim was countervoluntary.  Regardless of 
whether the application is civil or criminal, just resolution in this case requires the 
lawgiver to employ arithmetic proportion. To determine arithmetic proportion, a 
valuation of the damage sustained by the victim is necessary.  This damage is the loss 
which is then related back to the agent, namely Mitchell. Once the determination of 
damages, or loss, is established, an attempt to determine right proportion to be imposed 
on the defendant is possible.  In this instance, the Supreme Court was faced with the 
challenge of determining proportion based on aggravating circumstances surrounding 
the case.  Acts of violence are common but to allow enhance sentencing, the loss 
incurred must be greater to maintain arithmetic proportion. 
The victim in the instant case suffered serious injuries, including permanent 
brain damage. These damages are also compounded by the trauma incurred at the time 
of the event and future pain associated with his disability.  Therefore, justice will be the 
intermediate between these losses, incurred by the victim, and the gain, incurred by the 
defendants. The role of the court is to provide equality to each party involved with the 
victim having an equal amount before and after the unjust act.  Complicating the 
determination of the Court is the motivation for hate crimes which are to intimidate and 
threaten specific protected groups. These factors need also be calculated when 
considering damages incurred and proportion. 
Pure reciprocity fails to substitute or satisfy proportion in retributive justice. 
Reciprocity would require the defendants to endure the same violence and future 
disability of the victim.  This approach is prohibited by the prevailing law. Limiting the 
analysis to the criminal remedies, redress may include incarceration and restitution. 
Working within established legal parameters, proportion and equalization are 
developed between proper criminal  punishment and the loss sustained by the victim. 
The inherent inequality in exchange is obvious as the loss of the victim will outweigh 
any single aspect of sentence.  Nonetheless, the lawgiver is tasked with attempting to 
identify arithmetic proportion based on the facts and the available means of 
rectification.  Failure to strike this right proportion may then be in a sense, injustice.  
However, the lawgiver in this situation is working in the context of the legally just 
which involves the laying down of certain laws or decrees.  Assuming the impartiality 
of the lawgiver, the ruling is then considered intermediate and just.  To assist in the 
determination of proportional sentence, the circumstance of the actions of the agent 
must be considered to determine the type of harm and the character of the agent. 
When something unjust is done voluntarily, it is an object of censure and an 
unjust act. Voluntariness requires a person is acting knowingly and not in ignorance or 
duress.  Mitchell and the other defendants' actions were voluntary in that the assault was 
committed knowingly and without ignorance, duress, or the justification.   
As Mitchell incited the defendants to physically attack the victim, the resulting 
injuries cannot be considered unexpected or contrary to reasonable expectation as in the 
case of a misfortune. Also, the defendants committed the act knowingly with prior 
deliberation as evidenced by their discussion regarding the desire to target a white 
victim. The act is not simply unjust as prior deliberation and premeditation is 
established by accounts of those participating in the beating. Therefore, the harm is not 
simply an unjust act which is a common result of anger.  In this instance, the harm 
inflicted resulted from decision and was contrary to proportion or equality of 
distribution, Mitchell is both unjust and a bad character.  By establishing the type of 
harm and character of the agent, the lawgiver is better equipped to calculate 
proportionality and justice.   
In the foregoing case, Aristotelian justice theories appear evident in the 
determination to allow for enhanced sentencing in this specific crime.  This is based on 
a determination of proportionality.  A determine, which not exact, does appear to 
roughly follow an attempt at arithmetic proportion. 
 
Conclusion 
 Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is a foundation in the development of 
jurisprudence.  The Aristotelian concept of justice creates standards in evaluating 
modern legal decisions and trends.  The theories of distributive and retributive justice, 
in particular, provide a complex yet fluid mechanism for assessment of legal decisions. 
As demonstrated by the application to recent "hate crime" precedent, Aristotelian justice 
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